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 Protesting at the crossroads: framing ‘in-between places’ in spatial analyses of contention 
Bridging anthropological understandings of “non-place” (Augé, 1995) with 
insights on the “in-between city” (Sieverts, 2003), this paper advances the 
concept of in-between place as a useful heuristic device through which to 
examine spaces of contention outside the city. Focusing on a single protest 
organised by youth activists in Wadi Ara in the summer of 2013, it uses frame 
analysis to interrogate the power of roads, particularly the nodal power of inter-
urban crossroads, in enabling Palestinian protest in Israel. In so doing, this paper 
seeks not only to address the creative efforts to be seen and heard on the 
margins of an ethnocratic regime, but to contribute to a wider decentring 
research agenda that would move beyond the city in concrete and analytical 
terms. 
Keywords: roads, in-between places, protest, frames, Palestinians in Israel 
Abbreviated title: Protesting at the Crossroads 
 
All street protests operate according to a set of generalizable logics. Della Porta and Diani 
(2009, pp. 170-8) list three: the “logic of numbers”, the “logic of damage” and the “logic of 
bearing witness”. While this typology provides a useful starting point from which to examine 
the importance of place in protest, it fails to grapple with the spatial conditions that enable, 
or interrupt, the satisfaction of these logics of protest in practice. If, for example, it is 
intuitive that the logic of numbers serves to signal the worthiness, unity, numbers and 
commitment (Tilly, 2008, p. 71) of a cause, then it is equally intuitive that the absence of an 
easily accessible space to display and communicate that force of numbers represents a 
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fundamental challenge to satisfying the logics of protest in practice. Similarly, the distance 
of political claimants from major political and economic centres frustrates the capacity of 
protestors to disrupt prevailing power dynamics and effect political change. Ultimately, the 
lack of easily available, accessible as well as sufficiently sizable and central public spaces to 
protest not only limits the possibilities of capturing and transmitting opposing narratives 
and “moral messages” (Della Porta & Diani, 2009, p.176) to multiple audiences, but also 
reduces the very visibility of claims and claimants in the first place. 
Spatial analyses of protest, however, continue to assume a city-centred bias. The uprisings 
which spread across the Middle East from January 2011 captured international attention 
and ignited political imaginations in large part because these protests were clearly 
embedded at key symbolic sites in major cities which (for a time at least) became endowed 
by association with an almost talismanic quality of revolutionary significance (Fregonese, 
2013; Ramadan, 2013). The spatial order of so-called “rebel cities” (Harvey, 2012), which 
centre on a typical cityscape of squares, boulevards and roundabouts, rendered these sites 
“iconic” (Wallach, 2013) and made the protest events taking place within them both familiar 
and accessible, legible and intelligible to multiple audiences around the world.  
Yet, many communities have limited access to these symbolic sites as well as to many of the 
spatial signifiers which help to visually anchor and “index” (Spencer, 2011, p. 18) protest in 
the eyes of external audiences and connect it to the “global street” (Sassen, 2011). Socially, 
politically and geographically marginalised in a growing number of “spaces apart” (Moulin, 
2010) such as borderland areas, urban slums, rural peripheries, refugee camps as well as a 
whole range of other ethnic and socio-economic enclaves outside the city, access to the city 
for a vast number of people today is often heavily circumscribed if not precluded altogether 
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by uneven patterns of distribution, connectivity, mobility and wealth. Nonetheless, as the 
events of the Arab uprisings have shown, protest events taking place on the margins are not 
only common but are often very effective. Thus, scholars have increasingly recognised the 
need to “move beyond the city” in concrete and analytical terms to engage with the 
complex ways in which political contention “stretches outwards” from the city (Uitermark, 
Nicholls & Loopmans 2012, p.2546).  
Spatial analyses of protest in an ethnocratic regime – that is, in “a non-democratic regime 
which attempts to extend or preserve disproportional ethnic control over a contested multi-
ethnic territory” (Yiftachel, 1999, pp. 367-8) – requires going a step further. The “nixing” 
(King-Irani, 2007) of Arab cities in Israel through processes of land confiscation and 
enclosure as well as through uneven and unequal planning processes (Gradus, 1984; 
Yiftachel, 1999; Khamaisi, 2006; Yacobi, 2009), ethnically-differentiated regimes of 
(im)mobility (Handel, 2014; Kotef, 2015; Blatman-Thomas, 2017) and (in)visibility (Hatuka, 
2016) has not only underscored the importance of politics on the margins, it has decentred 
the (Arab) city in processes of Palestinian contention, creating new geographies of protest in 
the process.  
A small, but growing, body of work exists which examines “spatial alternatives” – that is, 
“different ways of relating to, analyzing, using and organizing space” (Gazit & Latham, 2014, 
p.64) – in Israel-Palestine. Protest events at The Wall, checkpoints, at the edges of divided 
cities as well as at destroyed villages (Baylouny, 2009; Gazit, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2011; 
Tawil-Swouri, 2011 & 2016; Hatuka 2012; Dibiasi, 2015) reveal a long-standing pattern of 
contention outside the city. This paper contributes to this scholarship by drawing attention 
to the importance of inter-urban crossroads as another alternative site of protest outside 
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the city in Israel-Palestine. More broadly, however, it seeks to contribute to the wider 
scholarship by using this case study to illustrate the importance of in-between places in 
spatial analyses of protest and political contention.  
Building on a critique of Marc Augé’s (1995) concept of “non-place”, the concept of in-
between place proposed here incorporates insights from urban studies, particularly work on 
the “in-between city” (Sieverts, 2003), to show how urban infrastructure and the circuitry of 
roads produces meaningful spaces of contention outside the city. Focusing on a single 
protest event which took place in the summer of 2013 at an inter-urban crossroads in the 
Wadi Ara region, it examines two different framing techniques – of “enframing” space 
(Mitchell, 1988) as well as of “collective action framing” (Benford and Snow, 2000) – 
through which this in-between place was transformed into a meaningful and politically 
significant space of contention.   
The paper proceeds as follows: Beginning with a theoretical elaboration of the concept of 
in-between place, the paper outlines its methodological approach to frame analysis. 
Attention then turns to the case study. Following a discussion of the politics of roads in 
enframing space in Israel, it examines the strategic choices and collective action frames used 
by the activists to frame their protest at Wadi Ara. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the broader significance of in-between places within spatial analyses of urban politics and 
collective action. 
IN-BETWEEN PLACES 
Focusing on the urban conditions which restrict or facilitate individual and collective 
liberties as well as possibilities for political change in practice, scholarship examining the 
right to the city has tended to focus on struggles to (re)shape the city (Lefebvre, 1996; 
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Harvey, 2003; Marcuse, 2009) from within it, whether through protest, participatory 
planning processes or the politics of everyday life. The city, however, is not synonymous 
with the urban. It represents just one part of a broader urban “totality” that shapes and 
influences social interactions and relations (Lefebvre, 2003). To speak of the urban, 
therefore, requires not only that we move “beyond the square” (Sharp & Panetta, 2016) in 
spatial analyses of contention but that we look beyond the city as well in order to recognise 
a wider range of spatial alternatives and possibilities for contention.  
Doing so in practical terms represents a challenge. If the urban is everywhere, there is a 
tendency for differences between types of places to collapse, and for those places where 
urban conditions are less recognisable or visible to disappear under the weight of larger, 
more recognisable and familiar ones. With a few notable exceptions, efforts to move 
beyond the city in analyses of urban politics have struggled to do more than extend their 
analytical scope of enquiry to the suburbs, banlieues, ashwiyyat, favelas, refugee camps and 
other enclaves on the city’s edges (Garreau, 1991; Soja, 1996; Li, 2009; Young & Keil, 2010; 
Addie, 2016). While these studies effectively demonstrate the negative effects of “peri-
urbanization” (Coward, 2009) or “splintering urbanism” (Graham & Marvin, 2001) upon the 
communities who reside there, they nonetheless perpetuate a city-centred or metropolitan 
view of urban life which does not adequately reflect or represent the distribution of 
population groups as well as respective struggles for social and political justice today.  
Studies examining the effects of ethnocratic governance on Palestinians in Israel have also 
struggled to break with this city-centred view. A focus on “mixed cities” (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 
2003; Yacobi, 2009; Gazit & Latham, 2014) – those large Jewish cities (such as Jerusalem, 
Haifa, Jaffa or Lod) with a significant Palestinian minority population “most of which were, 
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before 1948, grand Arab cities that were defeated and whose original Arab majority 
populations were displaced” (King Irani 2007: 180) – remains popular. With their particular 
demographic make-up and patterns of concentration, mixed cities are useful case studies 
for the study of ethnic expansionism and control as well as of conflict urbanism (Misselwitz, 
2006). Nevertheless, only ten per cent of Israel’s 1.8 million Palestinian citizens live in 
“mixed” cities (Jabareen, 2014). Subject to a process of “urbanization without cities” 
(Khamaisi, 2004) and denied the right to live in 942 Jewish localities (Jabareen, 2015, p.20), 
the vast majority of Palestinians in Israel (90 per cent) live in approximately 78 Arab-only 
urban localities of varying size that are distinctive not only in terms of their lower socio-
economic standing, underdeveloped urban infrastructure and public services vis-à-vis Jewish 
localities but by patterns of regional fragmentation (in northern, central and southern 
enclaves or pockets of settlement), as well as physical and geographic separation from 
Jewish symbols and centres of power (McGahern, 2016). 
A more radical “relational reading of place” (Amin, 2004, p.34) is, therefore, required; one 
that does not assume traditional dialectics of centre and periphery (Young & Keil, 2010) with 
the (expanded) city at its centre. Bridging two related concepts – the concept of “non-place” 
and that of the “in-between city” – this paper advances the concept of in-between place as a 
means of doing this. Building on anthropological understandings of place, Marc Augé’s 
(1995) concept of non-place has proven a popular reference point for the study of a wide 
range of interstitial spaces such as motorways and highways, but also airports, 
supermarkets and hotel lobbies. Worthy of examination, we are told, because they are “the 
real measure of our time” (Augé, 1995, p. 64), a non-place is understood to be a 
consequence, function and a condition of “supermodernity” because of the way in which 
they produce a uniquely individuated, dislocated and solitary experience of travel. This 
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experience of travel, Augé explains, results in a detached and simplified way of being and 
seeing in time and place; a “distinctive optic” (Scott, 1999, p. 11) which creates a certain 
type of tunnel vision which detaches both the traveller and the experience of place from the 
ordering and rationalising processes which have produced it. The geometric line of the road, 
the limited presence of signage, the even arrangement of light fixtures, as well as uniform 
height and width restrictions on road-side fencing, ditches, verges and vegetation, create 
envelopes of wide, flat, open spaces which not only facilitate high-capacity, high-speed 
travel but produce a distanced, dislocated and depoliticised view of a blurred and 
anaesthetic landscape. 
Augé nonetheless exaggerates the difference between places and non-places. As Peter 
Merriman notes, “[p]lace and non-place are always relational, contingent and continually 
folded into one another” (2004, p.149). By emphasising a particular experience of travel, 
Augé reifies certain types of landscape, traveller, speeds of travel and particular parts of the 
journey which conform to his theorisation – in this case, the mobile vantage point of the 
middle class (and usually male) individual traveller as he travels at high speed through it – 
while downplaying other types of road user as well as the points at which traffic slows, 
intersections appear, views come into sharper focus and interactions between people 
become possible. Similarly, his characterisation of the entirety of the motorway or highway 
as a singular, standardised interstitial space, not only reinforces the notion of place “as a 
territorially bounded residential district” (Martin, 2003 p.732) but blurs into insignificance 
the large number of interstitial points which exist along it and which, because of their 
different material arrangements and space-time configurations, possess or can be 
generative of place-making possibilities.  
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Merriman provides a useful starting point from which to redress these issues. Using mobility 
as a lens through which to re-examine the dynamic, contingent, topological assemblages 
that have led to the “placing” of motorways in the United Kingdom in particular ways, he 
builds on Kevin Hetherington’s view of places as “mobile effects” (Hetherington, 1997, 
p.184) to point out the more “complex habitations, practices of dwelling, embodied 
relations, material presences, placings and hybrid subjectivities associated with movement 
through such spaces” (Merriman, 2004, p.154). Yet, Merriman’s important work on the 
relational power of roads remains focused on the “spaces of the car-driver” (2004, p.158) 
rather than other types of experiences and spaces which are folded into road-spaces and 
which road-spaces, in turn, feed into.  
The concept of the “in-between city”, or Zwischenstadt, provides a useful way of drawing 
out the broader socio-spatial and political significance of roads. First outlined by Tom 
Sieverts (2003) and subsequently developed by others (Young & Keil, 2010 & 2014; Addie, 
2016), the concept of the in-between city emerged out of an effort “to grasp the novel 
urban form that has emerged beyond the traditional, more compact, uni-centred European 
city” (Young & Keil, 2010, p.89). Tracing the effect of outward urban sprawl in shaping new 
and uneven geographies of power, it emphasised the key role played by (the uneven 
distribution of) infrastructure provision, connectivity, use, availability and mobility (Addie, 
2016) in creating new nodal formations.  
Shifting its focus from the city-centre to the edges of an expanded metropolitan area, 
particularly certain types of spaces within it (airports, transport thoroughfares, landfills as 
well as retail and industrial zones), its emphasis on “functionally specialised nodes” 
(Sieverts, 2003), “technoburbs” (Fishman, 1987), “ethnoburbs” (Li, 2009) in creating 
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patterns of “connectivity and disconnectivity and resulting vulnerabilities for the 
populations there” (Young & Keil, 2014, p. 1594) has usefully stressed the importance of a 
polycentric approach to the study of urban politics. Nonetheless, the concept of the in-
between city retains a narrow reading of place based on the criteria of propinquity, 
traditional forms of community and permanent forms of dwelling. It has also resulted in an 
overly pessimistic reading of the possibilities for socio-spatial interaction and contention 
which arise as a direct result of the material make-up, socio-spatial configuration and 
placement of interstitial points, or nodes, on a wider network.  
“While the in-between city is the playground of all kinds of state-sponsored 
strategies of planning and politics, it is no destination of such activities, but 
merely a container and recipient of higher order restructurings. The in-between 
city, in fact, is an “anaesthetic” environment, which has no memory and does 
not lend itself to be remembered as distinct. It is produced to be transgressed at 
high speed to reach other points in the urban region.” (Young & Keil, 2010, p. 
92)  
This description of the in-between city as an anaesthetic environment is reminiscent of 
Augé’s conceptualisation of non-place. So too does Augé adopt a narrow set of criteria 
against which to categorise motorways and highways as non-places. For him, a place should, 
as Merriman points out, be “localized, familiar, known, organic, occupied and meaningful” 
(2004, p. 146) and “associated with a sense of history, home and dwelling” (2004, p148). 
Both a non-place and the in-between city are understood to lack these associations and 
necessary conditions to be considered a place in a meaningful sense.  
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The concept of in-between place proposed here challenges this view. Unlike traditional 
bounded notions of place, an in-between place does not represent a single community or 
sense of history. Nor does it require a territorial boundary or dwelling to be considered 
meaningful. Shaped by its material configuration as much as by the people who move 
through it for different reasons and purposes, an in-between place possesses its own 
temporary constellation (Massey, 2005) of power based on the different trajectories and 
relationalities which together make it meaningful. A mobile effect, it is its nodal power and 
placement outside the city on a wider road network that allows a distinctive kind of spatial 
politics to emerge there. This provides the basis from which to “place” inter-urban 
crossroads as a particular type of in-between place and interrogate its deeper significance 
within a spatial analysis of collective action. 
FRAMING PLACE: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
This paper uses frame analysis to illustrate the significance of one in-between place in 
processes of political contention. Typically understood as a bounded “field of vision” 
(Ingram, 2009; Williams, 2014) and associated with symbolic-interactionist and 
constructivist approaches to the study of how individuals and groups both represent reality 
and organise, perceive and communicate meanings and experiences (Goffman, 1974), a 
frame “implies both the construction of a world and of a way of seeing ourselves in it” 
(Dovey, 1999, p.1).  
It is the discursive and spatial dimensions of framing to both shape and represent reality 
that makes them worthy of analysis. While much of the prevailing scholarship engaging 
frame analysis has tended to emphasise the discursive basis of framing processes, this paper 
also wishes to emphasise the spatial dimensions of frames as well as the grounded 
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materialities which underpin them and give frames their meaning. In order to do this, it 
examines two different types of framing techniques which together illustrate the power of 
roads alongside the nodal power of crossroads.  
Examining the emergence of modern infrastructures of roads, railways, schools and police 
stations in Egypt in the late nineteenth century, Timothy Mitchell outlined the notion of 
“enframing” as a modern technique used to reorder space. Defined as “a method of dividing 
up and containing, as in the construction of barracks or the rebuilding of villages”, 
enframing “operates by conjuring up a neutral surface or volume called ‘space’” (1988, p. 
44). Premised upon a neutral representation of space to the “observing eye” (1988, p.9), 
this technique of enframing usefully illustrates distinctions not only between representation 
and reality, but between the observer and world represented inside its “frame”. While 
Mitchell’s concept of enframing remains sadly neglected within scholarship today, the 
perspective of control which underpins it represents the dominant frame in thinking about 
the power and politics of roads in Israel-Palestine. 
The study of “collective action frames” (Benford & Snow, 1998, 2000), by contrast, allows us 
not only to understand how Palestinian activists “make sense of events in ways that 
highlight a collective set of values, beliefs and goals for some sort of change” (Martin, 2003, 
p.733), but the ways in which they use place to communicate and increase the resonance of 
their claim or grievance to wider audiences. It does this by allowing us to understand how 
these local actors identify problems (“diagnostic framing”), propose solutions to these 
problems (“prognostic framing”) and make calls for collective action (“motivational 
framing”). The “resonance” of these collective action frames amongst audiences is, in turn, 
dependent upon, and determined by, the credibility and familiarity of the frames used. 
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While the prevailing literature on framing processes has tended to focus on the relationship 
between values, cultures, collective identities and ideologies in shaping the content and 
resonance of framing processes, it has tended to downplay both the spatial significance of 
collective action frames and the impact which the material configuration of place has in 
shaping framing processes. To redress this acknowledged imbalance in the literature 
(Benford & Snow, 2000) and to place collective action frames within their local context, the 
paper combines a strategic approach to the study of collective action (Jasper, 2004) with an 
understanding of enframing to draw out the more complex interplay which exists between 
roads and contentious politics in practice.  
The ethnographic material presented here was gathered over a seven-month period from 
July to September 2013 and from February to May 2016. Methods used included 
participation observation of the protest event itself which took place on 1 August 2013 as 
well as 12 semi-structured interviews with youth activists who both organised and attended 
the protest. More than thirty additional interviews were also undertaken with a range of 
local planners, NGO representatives, political figures, photojournalists and local residents 
from the Wadi Ara region who are knowledgeable about various aspects relating to the 
protest, surrounding roads and local planning in Wadi Ara.  
The activists interviewed were aged between 18 and 23 at the time of the protest. Half were 
women. Most the semi-structured interviews took place in person in the city of Haifa in 
2016 while a smaller number took place in the cities of Umm el Fahem, Jerusalem and Beer-
Sheva. One took place via Skype. Follow-up interviews were also conducted with three 
activists and incorporated an additional ethnographic dimension, whereby I would 
accompany the activists on foot or by car to revisit the protest site. This “go-along” 
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approach (Kusenbach, 2003) is inspired by ethnographic methods of “talking whilst walking” 
(Anderson, 2004), where walking – and moving more generally – in a place not only serves 
as “an active trigger to prompt knowledge recollection” (2004, p. 254) but helps to unearth 
the meanings, values and significance attached to these places by those who used them to 
disrupt the Israeli Jewish majority and challenge the state. Visual material – photographs, 
posters and videos – were also shared both as a means of triggering memories and 
illustrating the significance of the site. To protect the identities of the youth activists 
interviewed for this study all quotes used here have been fully anonymised.  
FRAMING THE POWER OF ROADS IN ISRAEL-PALESTINE 
 “As mechanisms of control, roads are ideal. They are permanent structures. 
They flow through long stretches of territory, inducing a feeling of natural 
connectedness, yet they effectively claim and monopolize land by their very 
routes. Roads are banal. They can be made to look inoffensive ad even benign 
and attractive – or, if need be, they can be made to look like imposing and 
intimidating barriers. They can be opened or closed, and used as a means to 
separate, unite or channel populations, instruments of control and 
development.” (Halper, 2000, p. 18) 
A study of Israel’s occupation “reveals an array of controlling devices that have aimed to 
naturalize and render the occupation invisible, concealing the political violence and 
exploitation that have upheld it” (Gordon, 2008, p. 7). The construction and expansion of 
major cross-regional, inter-urban highways connecting settler colonies in the West Bank to 
Jerusalem and, beyond that, Tel Aviv while deliberately bypassing local Palestinian towns 
and communities it once served have gone alongside, and in front of, settlement-building 
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and –expansion processes (Weizman, 2007; Gordon, 2008; Selwyn, 2001; Pullan et al., 2007; 
Handel, 2014; Salamanca, 2015; Bishara, 2015).  
The power of roads to contain and enframe Palestinian communities is, however, not 
limited to the occupation. During the Nakba (or disaster) of 1948, over 750,000 Palestinians 
were displaced over 400 Arab villages depopulated inside the territory that was to become 
the state of Israel. As Figure 1 below shows, the proximity of Palestinian communities to key 
roads and strategic junctions – particularly along the Tel-Aviv Jerusalem corridor and at the 
mouth of the Jezreel valley along today’s Highway 66 (Kadman, 2015, p. 15) – increased the 
likelihood of depopulation, destruction and confiscation (Morris, 2004; Khalidi, 2006; 
Abbasi, 2010; Kadman, 2015).   
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The events of 1948 marked only the beginning of a radical process of territorial and socio-
political reordering which sought to “fill” in the vacuum left by the destruction and 
depopulation of Arab neighbourhoods with new Jewish settlements (Falah, 1991). It also 
instituted a new regime of movement (Handel, 2014; Kotef, 2015) that was facilitated by 
eighteen years of military rule (1948-1966), “emergency regulations” (including the 
introduction of curfews, “closed areas” and an extensive permit systems) which served not 
only to confiscate additional land, prevent the return of “infiltrators” (Palestinian refugees 
Figure 1: Road networks and Palestinian localities in northern Israel in 1948. Source: author 2016. 
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and internally displaced persons) and surveille Palestinian political activity but to restrict 
patterns of movement of the remnant Palestinian community outside of their towns and 
villages (Jiryis, 1968; Sa’di, 2013; Robinson, 2013).  
New settlement blocs were established (Falah, 1991, p.76) around “development towns” 
built on confiscated land which acted as strategic buffers and counter-weights to the future 
outward expansion of remaining Arab localities (Emmett, 1995; Rabinowitz, 1997; Forman, 
2006; McGahern, 2016). As Figure 2 below illustrates, a network of roads and 
communication linkages spun out to connect these (Jewish) development towns with Jewish 
centres, bypassing or ignoring larger Arab settlements on the way. Highway route 77, for 
example, which was once the main west-to-east road connecting Haifa to Tiberias, was 
rerouted to bypass the Arab city of Nazareth (Emmett, 1995: 30; McGahern, 2016), while a 
similar fate awaited other highways which connected or lay adjacent to other major Arab 
towns, containing and immobilising their Palestinian residents even further.  
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New regional master plans introduced a zoning system through which the development of 
Arab localities could be more tightly controlled and limited. Major roads now came to 
delineate the boundaries of Arab localities, and the extent of (Arab) municipal authority, as 
well as areas or zones earmarked for residential, commercial or industrial development. 
Increasing privatisation of the economy acted as a major “driving force” (Rabinowitz & 
Vardi, 2010) in new road construction, extension and widening projects. Two main highways 
connecting Nazareth with its hinterland and other major urban centres – routes 60 and 75 – 
now bypassed most of the city, running along the municipal boundaries of the city itself 
(McGahern, 2016) which reduced local municipal involvement in infrastructural decision-
Figure 2: Road networks and Palestinian localities in northern Israel today. Source: author 2016. 
19 
 
making processes, as well as related investment funds and opportunities. Meanwhile, 
neighbouring Jewish towns, which were directly connected to major roads, were earmarked 
for the creation of new industrial zones, received heavy investment in terms of government 
spending and infrastructural development.  
The strategic underdevelopment of, and underinvestment in, Arab towns and cities served 
not only to stunt internal development of social and economic spaces in Arab localities but 
to entrench uneven patterns of mobility further. A distinctive pattern of daily outward 
Palestinian labour migration to Jewish towns and cities developed and remains one of its 
most recognisable and familiar legacies today (Blatman-Thomas, 2017). An equally 
distinctive pattern of territorial distribution emerged. Most Arab-only localities in Israel are 
effectively concentrated inland in an area roughly encircled by highways. With few 
exceptions, the densely populated coastal strip and borderland areas to the north and east 
are almost entirely Jewish-only. The majority of Palestinian towns and villages, by contrast, 
are set back from main roads and are only indirectly connected to the highways via a system 
of minor, spur roads, which are, in turn, often accessible only by car.  
Thus, Israel’s road network reveals a distinctive territorial pattern of ethnically-defined 
“privileged communities” as well as “privileged points” of access (Handel, 2014) along 
Israel’s road network. The circuitry of roads not only produces two separate, ethnically-
defined spaces of mobility – one a “contiguous, rapid, tightly knit Jewish space” and the 
other, a “fragmented, slow, uncertain Palestinian space” (Handel, 2014, p. 505) – but it has 
created a collection of concentrated, land-locked, disconnected and invisible islands of 
Palestinian settlement that are surrounded, contained and enframed by roads.  
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As Achille Mbembe points out, however, the purported functionality of roads is often 
subject to a process of doubling, where “systems and practices operate in variance with 
their purported objective” (cited in Larkin, 2013, p. 334). If “infrastructures are the means 
by which a state proffers… representations to its citizens and asks them to take those 
representations as social facts” (Larkin, 2013, p. 335), the degree to which such 
representations are successfully internalised, or not, depends upon the political 
subjectivities, positionalities and imaginaries of those who encounter and use them.  
For Israeli Jewish road users, Palestinian towns and villages are often “[v]iewed as if through 
an impenetrable glass wall” (Benvenisti, 2000, p. 56). This optical illusion is made possible by 
the physical destruction and erasure of the landscape in combination with the circuitry of 
roads. In the process of “getting rid of ruins” – those visible signs and reminders of the 
indigenous inhabitants’ claims to the land – priority was often given to “areas exposed to 
the public eye, such as the centre of Jewish communities, in sight of major transport routes 
and in tourist sites” (Kadman, 2015, p. 27), resulting in a systematic public works 
programme to “beautify” the roads and surrounding landscape by planting European trees 
and engaging in a range of other landscaping techniques designed to block or redirect the 
eye of the traveller (Leshem, 2013). 
The view of roads is, however, very different for Palestinians living on the other side of this 
glass wall. As sites of direct and indirect barriers to movement which can create a physically 
as well as mentally embodied “politics of disorientation” (Bishara, 2015, p. 34), roads serve 
as concrete reminders of prevailing asymmetries of power. By having to recalculate the 
quickest, easiest and safest way to travel, the experience of road travel can also, however, 
produce valuable socio-political knowledge as well as alternative forms of sociality. In 
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response to the strategy of erasure of Palestinian place-names from road signage and maps 
(a strategy which is well discussed in the literature (Benvenisti, 2000; Azaryahu & Kook, 
2002; Bigon & Dahamshe, 2014)), Amahl Bishara observes on a car journey from Bethlehem 
(in the West Bank) to a Land Day protest in the Bedouin village of Al-Araqeeb (in southern 
Israel) that “asking directions was part of a Palestinian sociality that built connections and 
trust among Palestinians across differences of class and urban-rural difference, a practice 
that resisted a politics of disorientation and cooperatively reconstituted the landscape” 
(2015, p. 41).  
These different collective experiences of roads reveal not only a distinctive type of “double 
vision” but the power of roads in (en)framing the other. While, in the eyes of Israeli Jewish 
travellers, the road may represent a natural, neutral or even anaesthetic “in-between” 
space devoid of people as well as of much social or political significance, this view depends 
upon a fluid, uninterrupted and uneventful transit through space. By contrast, roads, for 
Palestinians, are loaded with political significance and serve as concrete reminders as well as 
symbols of enclosure, expropriation, opportunity and violence. These experiences and 
representations of roads are, nonetheless, fluid and malleable. As sites of individual and 
collective autonomy, sociality and, as the next section will show, collective action, the 
strategy of using, occupying and protesting at the crossroads seeks not only to reframe 
roads but to create alternative optics and political imaginaries for Palestinians living in 
Israel. 
“PRAWER WILL NOT PASS” 
In 2011, the Knesset (Israeli parliament) proposed a bill, referred to as the Prawer-Begin 
Plan, which set out to forcibly displace and resettle 70,000 Bedouin, demolish 35 
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“unrecognised villages” i in the southern Negev region, and confiscate up to 800,000 
dunams (200,000 acres) of Palestinian land (Adalah, 2013; Sweitat, 2015; Meir, Roded & 
Ben-Israel, 2016). When the bill was approved in 2013, the leadership of the High Follow-Up 
Committee for Arab Affairs (an extra-parliamentary umbrella organisation formed in the 
1980s to represent the interests of the Palestinian minority in Israel on a national level) 
declared a day of strike action to take place on the 15th of July which was to involve a series 
of small demonstrations in twelve to fifteen Arab towns and villages across Israel.  
This strategy of strike action was a familiar one in the repertoire of Palestinian contention. 
Typically associated with annual commemorative events such as Land Day (first organised in 
1976 to protest government decision to expropriate thousands of dunams of Palestinian 
land), plans to mirror it to protest the Prawer-Begin Plan caused consternation amongst 
many local activists who viewed this as a weak and mostly symbolic display against what 
many called a “second Nakba”. As one female student-activist observed: 
“We were very frustrated by these plans for demonstrations. They were very 
traditional and would be invisible, mostly inside [Arab] villages and cities… The 
ability of strikes to raise awareness, even among our society, usually didn’t work. 
People got used to striking. It became normal. It didn’t even raise questions 
anymore about why we were striking.” 
The need to do something different, to “raise the roof” of protest, as another female activist 
put it, and confront both the Prawer-Begin Plan and the Israeli Jewish public in a direct and 
meaningful way was clearly articulated from the start. Working in a non-governmental 
organisation at the time, one local activist observed: 
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“The atmosphere was that something had to be done that was not traditional, 
not the same type of protest that we always do [which] is basically 
demonstrations inside the villages, it’s having the slogans, and standing in small 
numbers inside the villages, and not having any protest outside, not having any 
kind of clash or confrontation with the police, or with the public sphere outside 
the village.” 
Instead of organising tens of protests at one time which few would see and care about, an 
alternative strategy was formulated which would focus instead on organising a series of 
large, consecutively-held protest events on major roads. With little time, few resources and 
limited experience of independently organising nation-wide protests, they sought to make 
use of what was already available to them. As one female activist recalled: 
“We said, why not use the available one they are doing and try to take it to 
another level of visibility in terms of the discourse, and the locations, the people 
involved, the audience.”  
Three committees were set up: a field committee, responsible for coordinating action on 
the ground during the protest event itself; a media committee, responsible for framing the 
protest as well as coordinating outreach activities with local and international audiences; 
and a location committee, tasked with identifying suitable sites to protest. The decision of 
where exactly to protest was, however, not a straightforward one.  Three criteria were 
identified against which the suitability of each potential site was to be measured. These 
were that the protest site be as significant, central and safe as possible. 
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To satisfy the first criteria of significance it was determined that the protest site be located 
on a major road that was significant for Israeli (Jewish) travellers and for the state. As one 
female activist put it:  
“When you want to say something, you should go outside of your city because in 
your village no one will care. You could demonstrate every day for three years 
and no one would care because it’s out of sight. It’s like a black hole. No one 
would see it. There are no Jews in the village.”  
Reflecting on the route usually taken by the annual Land Day demonstration in the north, 
which involved a march between the Arab towns of Sakhnin and Arrabeh, one of the 
location committee members commented:  
“It should be an important place because we want to annoy the state… It’s not 
like [using] the street between Arrabeh and Sakhnin, where I will only annoy the 
people from Arrabeh who want to travel to Sakhnin. It’s not the point. It should 
be connected to an Israeli city, to an Israeli settlement, it should be a very vital 
road for the state or for some place.”   
The decision to protest at the crossroads of a major highway represented, as one local 
writer observed, an “escalation decision”. “We have to cancel this project; we have to 
cancel this bill. And to do that, you have to make steps in the places that Israelis care for.” 
This perspective was clearly rooted in an understanding of roads as “Jewish roads”. As a 
young female student activist elaborated: 
“The roads here in Israel are one of the tools of the government to make 
borders around the village. So, the roads are not ours. We own our lands but our 
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villages are limited with so many roads, green areas and Jewish [settlements]. 
So, for us, these government tools are something which limit us. This is the place 
we are fighting for. The road for us is a Jewish road. It’s not our road. If we had 
demonstrations inside the village, nobody would care. We will make our tour of 
the village; we will have some thousand people in the village. Nobody would 
care. When the demonstration goes out of the town or the village, the real thing 
would happen, because there are Jewish cars on the road. It’s like 
demonstrating our [right] to own this place and go outside the borders that they 
want for us.”  
Targeting main roads, therefore, reflected a clear and deliberate strategy to be seen and 
heard - of capturing the gaze of Jewish audiences, “annoying” the state as well as pulling the 
veil of neutrality from Jewish eyes with regards to the role of roads in processes of land 
confiscation and territorial control. As one of member of the media committee observed, it 
represents “a way of expressing yourself that is very powerful here, because it’s very easy, 
especially for the Jewish Israelis, to live in a bubble… so it’s like you enter [burst] this kind of 
bubble in a very strong way.”  
For others, the strategy of protesting at the crossroads went further still. As one male 
activist put it:  
“You need to know where your limits are and where your border is, and the 
minute you think of breaking that… What we were saying is that we know our 
borders and we are crossing these borders. (…) The Israeli authorities deal and 
they think of our towns as a private space, as you do of someone’s house. So, it’s 
their private space. Israeli public space, by contrast, is not an Arab space. So, for 
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me, it’s a clash over the public space. We want to control the street. This is the 
point. We know that.” 
Moving outside their villages to occupy main roads, therefore, not only satisfies the 
logics of protest, it becomes the essence of political mobilisation and transformation.  
 
 
At the outset, Route 65 was identified as an obvious road to target. A major cross-country 
highway, it spans one hundred kilometres from the Mediterranean coast to the north-
eastern reaches of the Galilee. As Figure 3 shows, this stretch of road not only links 
important Jewish centres but is one of the few major roads which intersects with an area of 
large Palestinian settlement in Israel. Approximately 20 kilometres of this route – from the 
Iron interchange to Megiddo junction (highlighted above) – passes tens of Arab towns and 
villages as well as Israel’s second largest Arab city (Umm el Fahem).ii 
It is in this regard that the importance of the second main criteria – that of centrality – 
becomes evident. As one of the location committee members observed, Palestinian protest 
in Israel had historically remained a local affair:  
Figure 3: The Wadi Ara section of Route 65. Source: author 2016. 
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“People from the Triangle area would not come to the north… We need to give 
people good reasons to come and not to bring them to protests which are two 
hours away. Because then only the hard-core activists will come.”  
The capacity of the site to attract large numbers of Palestinians was continuously 
emphasised. As one of the media committee members put it: “we don’t want to be the 
generation that saw it happen and didn’t do anything about it”. To ensure a high turn-out, 
the framing strategy they employed tapped into widespread feelings of anger (the protests 
were widely referred to as “day of rage” protests) as well as of feelings of collective 
responsibility and duty. “People needed to understand that if they didn’t protest, they will 
be remembered in history as a people who betrayed a generation,” explained one local 
Palestinian writer and activist.  
Recognising a deep apathy for traditional party politics among Palestinian youth, the 
activists also made extensive use of social media. An intense online and local media 
campaign was launched which served as an important platform for raising awareness 
about Prawer and the planned protests. A wide array of posters, videos and online 
material was produced which reinforced the immediate need for collective action, the 
power of the youth, and the symbolism of the roads. The slogan of the protest, 
“Prawer will not pass”, was graffitied on the walls of Arab towns and villages up and 
down the country. This slogan framed the protest and satisfied each of the three core 
framing tasks by identifying the root of the problem (land confiscation), the solution 
(blocking the streets) as well as its motivational content (collective responsibility),   
On the ground, however, the organisers faced a more pressing, practical challenge: how to 
get protesters to the site? Fostering a national campaign required going beyond mobilising 
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slogans to one of tackling uneven patterns of mobility, access and regional distribution. As 
Figure 3 above shows, the clear majority of Palestinians are concentrated in three separate 
regions: the northern Galilee region, the central Triangle region and the southern Negev 
region. Wadi Ara lies in the middle of the Triangle region, an area with a high concentration 
of Arab towns and villages that lies adjacent to the Green Line separating the West Bank 
from the state of Israel. Fragmented and poorly connected by roads and public transport, 
getting protesters from different parts of the country to Wadi Ara – and getting there on 
time – represented one of the biggest challenges the organisers faced. To ensure that 
people could come, free transportation was arranged and tens of busses were organised to 
take people from major Arab towns and cities in the region to the protest site.  
Before this could be arranged, however, the location committee had to determine a site 
that could be accessible to many busses. Along the 20-kilometre stretch of road, several 
junctions and crossroads of varying size and significance intersect with Highway 65. Most, 
however, are small and poorly paved roads which connect surrounding Arab villages. Only 
those junctions shown in Figure 3 represented viable options for the activists, providing 
wider entrances and better paved roads to channel and contain larger numbers of 
protesters.  
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Here, the third criteria of safety emerges. The chosen site needed to be as safe and as easy 
to control by the protesters as possible. In many ways, the open, flat plan of highways made 
the highway a safe (or safer) place to protest than areas which are overlooked and, thereby, 
vulnerable to police surveillance and sniper fire. Set back from centres of power, and away 
from the built environment of the city, highways avoid many of the vulnerabilities usually 
associated with manifestations of urban verticality (Weizman 2007; Rosen and Charney, 
2016). They also, however, pose risks. The lack of resources, shelter and places to hide or 
regroup make protest actions on highways easier to break-down and dissolve. Similarly, 
poorly paved access roads, the presence and size of roadside barriers, motorway railings 
and ditches, indirectly limit the capacity of protesters to assemble, and remain unified, for 
long periods of time. 
Figure 4: The protest site located at crossroads between Route 65 and the village of Ar’ara. 
Source: author 2016. 
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While traditional protest sites inside Arab villages are often located far from (Jewish) 
centres of power, they benefit from being more difficult to access by the coercive apparatus 
of the state, and the police in particular (McGahern, 2016). This is not the case with major 
roads and highways. In fact, two police stations are located along the 20-kilometre stretch 
of Route 65 which the activists were targeting. The largest of these is Iron station, which is 
located directly across from the village of Ar’ara. The strategy of protesting at the 
crossroads allowed the police stationed there a more direct line of access, increasing the 
potential for the protest to be dispersed. This risk was, however, knowingly considered by 
the protesters who saw police violence as an inevitable consequence of their strategy of 
protesting on major roads. Nonetheless, certain junctions were considered too dangerous to 
consider. As one female activist involved in organising the protest observed: 
“We are not crazy. We do not go to Kvish Shesh [Highway 6]. We go to places 
that we can control. It’s not Meidan at-Tahrir [Tahrir Square] in Egypt. We know 
that we are maximum two thousand, three thousand people. So, we do not go 
to huge places that we know that they are going to react in a very crazy way, I 
mean the police. So, we choose places that we can control somehow.”  
Open spaces were also considered too unsafe and difficult to secure. As one of the location 
committee members put it: 
“An open space allows the police to divide the protest into many parts that can 
be controlled. Because what gave the people the motivation, the brave attitude, 
is the feeling that they are between mass, there are people, you have support, 
there are thousands of people… but when there are 15 people, 20 people, you 
just get slapped around by the police…”  
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As a result, crossroads were considered to offer the best possibility for staging a significant, 
central and safe protest. However, not all crossroads could be used. The junction to the east 
of the village of Deir al-Hanun, for example, was discounted. Although it was large, it was 
surrounded by forest. Moreover, the road running next to it serviced mainly residents of the 
Jewish town of Katzir, as well as Jewish settlements in the OPTs. Within their calculations, a 
clear connection was made between the perceived suitability of a protest site and the 
relative proximity of the protest site to a Jewish or Arab village or town. Reflecting on the 
violent fragmentation of previous protests, one female activist and committee member 
explained: 
“If you go to a crossroads, you need to have an [Arab] village behind you. If they 
attack you, you need to have a place to run. When they attacked us [in Sakhnin], 
we didn’t know where to go. Some people went inside a field where there are 
some trees, others went… It’s in the middle of nowhere, of roads, of so many 
roads… so you don’t have somewhere to run. If you run for maybe 15 minutes, 
you get to Sakhnin… it’s far from Sakhnin. And it’s a very good place for the 
police, not for us. As someone who organised it, I saw what they did to the 
people… people strayed all over. So, if you choose a place, you should choose a 
place that if they attack you, you can go to the village. And they won’t go to the 
village.”  
Here, the nodal power of crossroads was activated by the protesters. The proximity of the 
crossroads to an Arab town or village was used to temper the vulnerability of exposure to 
the police. The location committee also took lessons learned from previous protests into 
account. As one of their committee members recounted:  
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“We needed someone to go ahead and check the location, see where we can 
run away when the operation starts… because we didn’t want people to run 
away to a place that is very open, where there would be a lot of injuries and 
arrests, [but] to be running towards houses that can protect them, or inside a 
village that would be harder [for the police] to enter.” 
Due to the historical depopulation and destruction of Palestinian villages located next to 
major roads, few crossroads could satisfy this criterion of proximity to an Arab village. There 
was a further complication. They needed to find a local village council that would not only 
be sympathetic to the goals of the protest but be willing to take the risk of supporting the 
protest in the face of likely sanctions by the state. This, however, was not a foregone 
conclusion. Some local councils refused to take the activists seriously, dismissing them, as 
one committee member recounted, as “a small bunch of impulsive teenagers”. Others 
refused out of fear or concern for potential repercussions. In this vein, the protest 
organisers were also accused, she continued, of “just bringing violence and destroying our 
local economy”.  
Given the real and perceived risks involved, local resistance was not unanticipated or 
unreasonable. As one male activist put it: “You can’t just impose it on the people.” While 
they debated amongst themselves at length whether local agreement should be secured, 
particularly if it was not forthcoming, the need for a cooperative local committee was 
considered too great to ignore. 
Ultimately, only one local village council – that of Ar’ara – proved receptive to the aims of 
the protesters at the time. Circumstances prevailed in their favour. Two months previously, 
the police had shut down the highway to the village at one o’clock in the morning and 
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bulldozed the house of one of their residents which created both a useful precedent and a 
sense of legitimacy for the protesters as they approached the local village council. The 
destroyed house was located next to a crossroads leading onto Route 65. Built on privately-
owned land in 1962, local planning and zoning laws had not yet come into effect which 
would retrospectively designate this type of construction activity “illegal”. It was its location 
next to the main road which made the house a target for demolition and increased the 
nodal power of the nearby crossroads.  
From tens of junctions along this stretch of highway known for Palestinian protest in Israel, 
therefore, the search for a site to protest ultimately found just one crossroads which 
satisfied all their criteria: the crossroads with Ar’ara, pictured in Figure 4 above. Discussing 
at length whether other junctions or crossroads might have been possible or made better 
choices, one female member of the location committee paused and after a moment’s 
hesitation reflected that, in the end, “we didn’t have a plan B.”  
CONCLUSION 
The protest at Wadi Ara was one of a series of protests organised at major junctions and 
crossroads up and down the country over a three-month period in 2013. Thousands 
attended these protests, the majority travelling by bus from towns and cities across Israel’s 
northern and central regions. While the protesters at Wadi Ara failed in breaking through 
the police barricades which blocked the entrances to Highway 65, their strategy of 
protesting at the crossroads did succeed in stopping traffic for several hours. This, together 
with the large number of protesters who attended, generated an unprecedented level of 
press coverage and attention. Local and international photojournalists embedded at each of 
the protest sites captured the efforts of the protesters to break through the police lines and 
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occupy the highway, as well as the violent police response to these efforts. The powerful 
imagery of protesters attempting to break the police cordon onto a major highway went 
viral. Therefore, even though the protesters at Wadi Ara failed in occupying Highway 65 
itself, their physical presence, force of numbers and increased visibility at a major 
crossroads ultimately helped transmit the “moral message” of the protest. Their strategy of 
protesting at the crossroads gave the protest the frame it needed to reach multiple local 
and international audiences and ultimately pressure the government to suspend the Bill at 
the end of 2013.  
The strategy of protesting at the crossroads discussed here shows the careful, deliberate 
and creative efforts by Palestinian protesters to be seen and heard. It also shows their 
awareness of, and willingness to harness, the nodal power of the crossroads. To stop the 
Prawer Begin Plan, they developed an alternative protest strategy that involved moving out 
of Arab towns and cities to occupy major roads and highways and, both literally and 
figuratively, stop the plan in its tracks. Their collective action frame satisfied each of their 
core framing tasks – the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing of their protest – 
and responded to the contested material significance and symbolic power of these roads. 
Their framing strategy resonated clearly with Palestinian activists who were cognisant of the 
power of roads as “Jewish roads” and had grown increasingly disillusioned with traditional 
patterns of protest. Notwithstanding the dangers and risks involved, its success in 
persuading and motivating Palestinians to mobilise in their thousands reveals the conscious 
efforts of the activists to pull the veil of neutrality associated with highways and harness the 
nodal power of the crossroads as part of an active strategy of place-making on the margins 
of an ethnocratic regime.  
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While it is beyond the purview of this paper to examine the protest event in detail or to 
provide an historic overview of the broader significance of inter-urban crossroads in 
Palestinian patterns of protest, what this paper has sought to do is to contribute to 
scholarship on spatial alternatives in Israel-Palestine in a manner that recognises and 
addresses the distinctive nodal power of these sites. Typically treated as local, unique or 
exceptional spaces apart – as “non-places” – the concept of in-between place proposed 
here provides a useful heuristic device through which to study both the significance of these 
places as well as identify a broader spatialisation of protest at in-between places in Israel-
Palestine.  
Proposing a new relational political of place that would also contribute to a broader 
decentring agenda within spatial analyses of contention, this paper’s analysis provides an 
opportunity to rethink the place-ness of so-called “non-places” and bring, on that basis, a 
range of different in-between places together which do not neatly fit within city-centred 
frameworks of analysis. Laying the tentative groundwork for a new direction of research 
from which to study the politics of in-between places, its emphasis on the power of roads – 
and, particularly, the nodal power of crossroads – provides an opportunity not only to 
decentre the city from analyses of contention but to bring together and compare spatial 
alternatives at a range of comparable sites. In Israel-Palestine, the importance of inter-
urban crossroads can therefore be relocated alongside more familiar sites such the Wall and 
checkpoints as well as other spaces apart such as at unrecognised villages and refugee 
camps. It also offers a possibility for considering similar spatial dynamics of contention at 
other spaces apart which increasingly make up the global map of contemporary political life, 
such as borderland areas, rural peripheries, refugee camps and other ethnic and socio-
economic enclaves outside the city. The political significance of these sites, and their 
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placement outside the city, ultimately demands a more focused and concerted effort to 
bring these in-between places to the centre of spatial analyses of contention.  
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